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FAMILY OWNERSHIP AND TAX AVOIDANCE IN INDONESIA: THE MODERATING EFFECT OF AUDIT QUALITY

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ABSTRACT
Tax avoidance is an action that can be taken by companies in an effort to reduce their obligation to pay taxes legally. Family and non-family companies have different characteristics in making tax avoidance decisions where family companies tend to prioritize the company's reputation in the future. This study aims to examine the effect of family ownership on the occurrence of tax evasion, as well as the role of audit quality in moderating this relationship. There are 777 companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2017 to 2021 as the study population. Companies that meet the sample criteria are 239 companies. The data analysis method used in this study is the panel regression method. The results showed that family ownership can influence ETR in a significant positive way. The effect of audit quality cannot strengthen the relationship between family ownership and tax evasion.

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ABSTRAK
Penghindaran pajak adalah suatu aksi yang dapat dilakukan oleh para perusahaan dalam upaya untuk mengurangi kewajiban mereka dalam membayar pajak secara legal. Perusahaan keluarga dan non-keluarga memiliki karakteristik yang berbeda dalam pengambilan keputusan penghindaran pajak dimana perusahaan keluarga cenderung lebih mementingkan reputasi perusahaan kedepannya. Penelitian bertujuan mengkaji pengaruh kepemilikan keluarga terhadap terjadinya penghindaran pajak, serta peran kualitas audit dalam memoderasi hubungan tersebut. Perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia dari periode 2017 sampai dengan 2021 sebanyak 777 perusahaan dijadikan sebagai populasi penelitian Perusahaan yang memenuhi kriteria sampel sebanyak 239 perusahaan. Metode analisis data yang digunakan dalam penelitian adalah metode regresi panel. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa kepemilikan keluarga dapat mempengaruhi ETR secara positif signifikan. Efek dari kualitas audit tidak dapat memperkuat hubungan antara kepemilikan keluarga dan penghindaran pajak.

1. INTRODUCTION

State revenue comes from compulsory levies or compulsory dues that carried out by the country. The mandatory dues that have been obtained are used to finance the production required by the state (Irawati et al., 2020). "Taxes are mandatory contributions to the state owed by people persons or entities of a coercive nature under the Act, with does not get direct reward and is used for needs the country for the greatest prosperity of the people". The quote is third amendment to the provisions of article 1 of Law No. 6 of 1983 on General Provisions and Tax Procedures (Law of the Republic Indonesia Number 28 Year, 2007).

The term tax for the state is a source of funds or income, but When viewed from an individual or corporate perspective, taxes have meaning different ones (Ibrahim et al., 2019). Corporate perspective explains taxes is an expense or burden of the company that can lowering the company's net profit. This tax avoidance is said to be legal because its nature does not show any contradiction against the provisions determined by the government in the rules Taxation. Although it is said to be legal, tax avoidance will of course cause an impact that will harm the country and also the company (Krisyadi &; Anita, 2022). The company will feel the impact if caught Commit tax evasion which will taint the good name company (Sujendra et al., 2019).

The occurrence of conflicts of interest in the company is caused by There is a separation between the owner of the company (principal) and management company (agent) described agency theory (Subagiastra et al., 2017). Party The principal who is the owner of the company only understands the conditions Company based on information provided by the agent provided trust to operate the company. However, the information provided It could have been manipulated by the agent for its own interests. Conflict A unique interest occurs in a family ownership company where There is a separation between minority shareholders and shareholders majority (Maharani &; Juliarto, 2019). Agency problems can be caused by: tax avoidance, where taxpayers are trying to minimize tax payments, while the fiscus attaches importance to income that as much as possible the state treasury funds for tax payments made by taxpayers (Wirdaningsih et al. 2016).

Some previous research results stated that the company with family ownership structures more or less aggressive in avoidance tax. The research in question is

research by Chen et al., (2010), Mafrolla & D'Amico. (2016), Indirawati & Dwimulyani. (2019), Puji et al. (2019), and Christa &; Adi (2020). In contrast, the results of research by Raditya et al. (2020), Yopie &; Elivia, (2022) and Pratama (2021) declare company ownership Families are less likely to do tax avoidance than corporations which is non-family possession.

Tax avoidance can be influenced by the characteristics of the company (Bianca &; Tang, 2018). There are differences in the actions or behavior of 3290 companies in tax avoidance efforts in Indonesia, which are divided into companies whose company ownership is Family Ownership and companies whose company ownership is not Family Ownership (Sujendra et al., 2019). Chen et al., (2010) state that companies with ownership Families are more effective in lowering measures to avoid taxes (Sujendra et al., 2019). Top reasons why companies with ownership Families are more effective at reducing tax avoidance actions because The company maintains the image and reputation of companies that have close relationships with family reputation among the community (Sujendra et al., 2019).

Family ownership companies usually avoid the occurrence of problems related to the company, because the company will later be demoted or handed over to family members in later generations (Gaaya et al., 2017).

Tax avoidance is an interesting research topic, but it's still There have not been many studies examining tax avoidance that influenced by ownership structure with additional moderation variables, namely: audit quality. Tax avoidance cases can also occur in companies Family, not only occurs in non-family companies. The study also Can research whether companies with family ownership structures in Indonesia does tax avoidance or not. The objectives of the study are Assessing tax avoidance influenced by family ownership in Indonesia: with a moderating effect of audit quality. Differences with research The preceding is to use three tax avoidance measurements to See which measurements can reflect tax avoidance conditions in Indonesia.

The study used several control variables such as size perusahaan (Firm Size), leverage, profitabilitas (Return On Asset), dan Market to Book Ratio. A large company size also has good assets and resources. adequate to minimize tax burden (Rakayana et al., 2021). Company With higher leverage tend to be more tax aggressive because Interest payments generated by the company's debt are deductible from taxes (Raditya et al.

2020). Companies with high profitability tend to avoid taxes (Susanto &; Veronica, 2022). Growth opportunities positively affects the level of tax avoidance (Gaaya et al., 2017).

A company whose form of ownership is ownership family or if a family member of the founder of the business has shareholders of 20% or more then this is a company with family ownership. By and large, company owners expect to Benefit by reducing costs incurred Including the payment of corporate tax by tax avoidance. Therefore, the owner compensates the agent who responsible in operating the company to perform tax avoidance. However, a family owned company is considered have more awareness of the potential punishment to be imposed by tax authorities and family reputation name damage (Raditya et al., 2020). By Therefore, family ownership companies choose not to do tax avoidance. A company managed on behalf of a family, state, or financial institution would be better than a company controlled by public company company without primary control (Panjaitan, et al., 2021). Result research by Chen et al. (2010), Christa & Adi (2020), Panjaitan et al. (2021) and Puji et al. (2019), showed that family ownership results in positive influence on tax avoidance. It means the company Family owners tend not to engage in tax avoidance.

H1: Family ownership positively affects tax avoidance.

Audit quality is considered an important governance feature that moderates the relationship between family ownership and tax avoidance (Gaaya et al; al., 2017). The agency's theory perspective explains audit quality has a role to play important in resolving problems arising from the outcome of the conflict interests between managers and their shareholders (Gaaya et al., 2017).

Audit quality is a feature of corporate governance that performs supervision and control of the actions of company managers to: prevent manipulation of financial statements and other fraudulent activities (Gaaya et al., 2017). High-quality auditors have less incentive to engage in corporate tax avoidance, as they face severe consequences when tax authorities reveal aggressive positions (Gaaya et al., 2017). The auditor with high quality in question is the Big Four Public Accountant. According to Gaaya et al. (2017), it is said that the influence of family ownership Against tax avoidance weakened due to the moderating effect of audit quality.

The results of the research researched by Wirdaningsih et al. (2016) revealed That quality audits can moderate the influence of family ownership against tax avoidance with CETR measurements. Audit quality The height held by a family ownership company indicates that The lack of opportunities that families have to do tax avoidance as overseen by strong corporate governance practices well (Maharani & Juliarto, 2019).

H2: Quality audits reinforce the positive influence of family ownership relationships against tax avoidance



Figure 1. Research Model

2. RESEARCH METHODS

The nominal scale and the ratio scale are the measurement scales used for all variables that will be examined in this study. By The source, the data in this study was taken through an intermediary that is secondary data. Types of data based on nature in this study is quantitative data where the data taken is in the form of numbers. Sample data For this research model is taken from the annual report on public companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for 5 consecutive periods, namely years 2017 to 2021. Criteria for sample company data that will be taken, namely (1) Companies that have been listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for 5 periods, namely the period 2017-2021; (2) There is an annual report which is complete in 5 periods; (3) The Company shall not suffer any losses on profit before tax in 5 periods; and (4) There is data that includes variables studied in 5 periods. A total of 777 companies are registered in Indonesia Stock Exchange as of December 2021. There are a number of companies that did not meet the criteria, so there were only 239 companies left with a total of 1,195 data to be researched and worked on.

Research variables consist of dependent, independent, control, variables, and moderation. The dependent variable or main topic under study is about: Tax Avoidance.

Family Ownership will be the variable affecting the dependent, its moderation variable is audit quality (Audit Quality). Firm Size, Leverage, ROA (Return on Assets), and Market to Book Ratio are control variables on this research.

The data analysis method used in research is the method panel regression. Here is a model of the equation being tested.

$$TA = \alpha + \beta 1FOWNi,t + \beta 2FS\ i,t + \beta 3LEV\ i,t + \beta 4ROA\ i,t + \beta 5MKTB\ i,t + \varepsilon\ i,t \quad \text{..... (1)}$$

Information:

TA = Tax avoidance with ETR, CFETR, and BTD measurements

a = Konstanta

β = Koephysin regresi

FOWN= Family ownership with fown1 and fown2 measurements

FS = Firm Size

LEV = Leverage

ROA = Return On Assets

MKTB = Market to Book Rasio

it = Company i in the t-th year

ε = Error

There are also equation models to test the moderation effect of quality Audit of family ownership relationships and tax avoidance. Next Model of the tested equation:

$$TA = \alpha + \beta 1FOWNi,t + \beta 2FOWN\ X\ AUDQLYi,t + \beta 3AUDQLYi,t + \beta 4FSi,t + \beta 5LEVi,t + \beta 6ROAi,t + \beta 7MKTBi,t + \varepsilon i,t \quad \text{..... (2)}$$

Information:

FOWN X AUDQLY = Moderation effect result

AUDQLY = Audit Quality

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

By using the purposive sampling method where the researcher selects data The sample is in accordance with the criteria that have been established as the object of research. Companies used as a sample of 239 over five years with a total of 1,195 data. The amount of data used in the study is 810 data warning because there is data outlier, this is as presented on

Table 1. Number of Research Sample Data

Keterangan	Jumlah	
Perusahaan yang terdaftar di BEI	777	Perusahaan
Perusahaan yang tidak memenuhi kriteria	(538)	Perusahaan
Jumlah yang digunakan dalam penelitian	239	Perusahaan
Jumlah Data Penelitian (5 tahun)	1.195	Data

12 equation models with three variable measurements were obtained dependent, two independent variable measurements, four control variables, and one moderation variables; which causes the amount of data tested to differ after through outlier tests as presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Number of Sample Data with Independent Variables FOWN1 &; FOWN2

Keterangan	FOWN1			FOWN2		
	ETR	CFETR	BTD	ETR	CFETR	BTD
Jumlah Data Penelitian	1,195	1,195	1,195	1,195	1,195	1,195
Data *Outlier*	(385)	(513)	(377)	(388)	(530)	(437)
Jumlah Data Observasi	810	682	818	807	665	758

Descriptive statistics is one of the data tests conducted for Knowing information from the data to be processed. Descriptive statistics divided into two, judging from the way it is processed, namely descriptive statistics for qualitative data and quantitative data. This qualitative descriptive statistic is specific to Processing data that is qualitative and not in the form of numbers. While This quantitative descriptive statistic specifically processes quantitative data and not in the form of facts or sentences but in the form of numbers.

Table 3. Descriptive Statistical Test Results on Equations 1 and 7

Variabel	N	Min.	Maks.	Rata-rata	Std. Deviasi
ETR	810	0,116	0,356	0,241	0,043
FOWN1	810	0,000	0,990	0,455	0,338
FS	810	25,796	35,084	29,629	1,819
LEV	810	0,000	2,486	0,149	0,175
ROA	810	0,002	0,709	0,096	0,097
MKTB	810	0,002	85,181	2,424	5,190
Variabel	N	Variabel *Dummy* = 1		Variabel *Dummy* = 0	
		Frekuensi	Persentase	Frekuensi	Persentase
AUDQLY	810	428	52,8	382	47,2

Tax avoidance variables with ETR measurements in Table 3, it is said that the lower the ETR value of a company, then The higher the tax avoidance action on the company.

Table in above displays the minimum value of the variable ETR of 11.6%. Average rating at an ETR of 24.1% which is close to 25% of the statutory rate The agency then the tax avoidance rate is getting lower. Descriptive statistics Qualitative shows from a total of 810 data as many as 382 data reports its finances are audited by Non-Big4. The remaining 428 data are data whose financial statements are audited by Big4.

Table 4. Descriptive Statistical Test Results on Equations 2 and 8

Variabel	N	Min	Maks	Rata-rata	Std. Deviasi
CFETR	682	(0,110)	0,441	0,111	0,096
FOWN1	682	0,000	0,988	0,428	0,339
FS	682	25,796	35,084	29,657	1,750
LEV	682	0,000	2,486	0,155	0,169
ROA	682	0,000	0,598	0,077	0,080
MKTB	682	0,004	60,672	2,193	4,223
Variabel	N	Variabel *Dummy* = 1		Variabel *Dummy* = 0	
		Frekuensi	Persentase	Frekuensi	Persentase
AUDQLY	682	295	43,3	387	56,7

Variable tax avoidance with CFETR measurement is the same concept with ETR, where the lower the CFETR value of a company, then The higher the tax avoidance action on the company. Serving Table 4 displays the minimum and maximum values of CFETR measurements ranging from -11% to 44.1%. Variable family ownership with The first measurement displays the percentage of shareholders held Companies with a range of 0 to 98.8%. A total of 387 data for which the company's financial statements were audited by Non-Big4 and as many as 295 data were audited by Non-Big4 The company's financial statements are audited by Big4 with a total of 682 data.

Table 5. Descriptive Statistical Test Results on Equations 3 and 9

Variabel	N	Min	Maks	Rata-rata	Std. Deviasi
BTD	818	(0,003)	0,136	0,016	0,017
FOWN1	818	0,000	0,990	0,439	0,340
FS	818	25,796	35,084	29,635	1,857
LEV	818	0,000	2,486	0,161	0,180
ROA	818	0,000	0,607	0,067	0,070
MKTB	818	0,002	85,181	1,944	4,033
Variabel	N	Variabel *Dummy* = 1		Variabel *Dummy* = 0	
		Frekuensi	Persentase	Frekuensi	Persentase
AUDQLY	818	373	45,6	445	54,4

Tax avoidance variables with the third measurement are: BTD measurement. In contrast to ETR and CFETR measurements, if the value BTD a high company, hence the

tax avoidance of that company is also high. With the lowest value of -0.3% and the highest value of BTD by 13.6%. Of the 818 data, as many as 373 data are financial statements the company was audited by Big4 with a percentage of 45.6%. Then the rest 445 data whose company's financial statements were audited by Non-Big4 with a percentage of 54.4%.

Table 6. Results of Descriptive Statistical Test on Equations 4 and 10

Variabel	N	Min	Maks	Rata-rata	Std. Deviasi
ETR	807	0,087	0,356	0,241	0,428
FS	807	25,796	35,084	29,631	1,813
LEV	807	0,000	2,486	0,148	0,173
ROA	807	0,002	0,709	0,097	0,098
MKTB	807	0,002	85,181	2,421	5,197
Variabel	N	Variabel *Dummy* = 1		Variabel *Dummy* = 0	
		Frekuensi	Persentase	Frekuensi	Persentase
FOWN2	807	568	70,4	239	29,6
AUDQLY	807	426	52,8	381	47,2

Different from the previous 6 equations, the previous equations using the independent variable with the first measurement. Whereas, 6 The next equation will use an independent variable with the second measurement. Table 6 shows a minimum value of ETR of 8.7% and 35.6% for the maximum value. A total of 239 data with The percentage of 29.6% is a non-family owned company or a company managed on behalf of the family. In contrast, the percentage is as large as 70.4% with 568 data is owned companies family. 52.8% and as many as 426 data are reported data His company's finances are audited by Big4. The remaining 381 data are data whose company's financial statements are audited Non-Big4.

Table 7. Descriptive Statistical Test Results on Equations 5 and 11

Variabel	N	Min	Maks	Rata-rata	Std. Deviasi
CFETR	665	(0,110)	0,441	0,109	0,097
FS	665	25,796	35,084	29,663	1,762
LEV	665	0,000	2,486	0,156	0,170
ROA	665	0,000	0,598	0,078	0,081
MKTB	665	0,004	60,672	2,207	4,243
Variabel	N	Variabel *Dummy* = 1		Variabel *Dummy* = 0	
		Frekuensi	Persentase	Frekuensi	Persentase
FOWN2	685	446	67,1	239	29,6
AUDQLY	665	291	43,8	374	56,2

Table 7 shows the minimum value of the CFETR variable at -11% and a maximum value of 44.1% with an average value of 0.109 and standard deviation amounted to 0.097. Table 7 presented as many as 219 data from a total of 665 data or 32.9% were non-family owned companies. Instead Companies with family ownership of 446 data or 67.1% from the total data. A total of 291 data or 43.8% of the total data are data that is the company's financial statements audited by Big4. While 56.2% or as many as 374 data are financial statement data the company is audited by Non-Big4.

Table 8. Descriptive Statistical Test Results on Equations 6 and 12

Variabel	N	Min	Maks	Rata-rata	Std. Deviasi
BTD	758	(0,003)	0,136	0,156	0,016
FS	758	25,796	35,084	29,673	1,874
LEV	758	0,000	2,486	0,159	0,182
ROA	758	0,000	0,607	0,653	0,684
MKTB	758	0,002	60,672	1,839	2,842
Variabel	N	Variabel *Dummy* = 1		Variabel *Dummy* = 0	
		Frekuensi	Persentase	Frekuensi	Persentase
FOWN2	758	517	68,2	241	31,8
AUDQLY	758	342	45,1	416	54,9

Known from the table presentation, the maximum value of the BTD variable is 13.6% and a minimum score of -0.3% from the average value of 0.156. Companies with family ownership structures are as many as 517 records with a percentage of 68.2%. The remaining 241 data are Companies with non-family ownership structures from a total of 758 data. The company's financial statements audited by Non-Big4 amounted to 54.9% or amounted to 416 data from the total data. Meanwhile, the company's financial statements that audited by Big4 at 45.1% or 342 records.

Table 9. Results of Hypothesis Test in Equations 1, 2, and 3

Variabel	FOWN1					
	ETR		CFETR		BTD	
	Koefisien	Prob.	Koefisien	Prob.	Koefisien	Prob.
C	1,364	0,000	-0,031	0,625	0,050	0,000
FOWN1	0,038	0,094	-0,003	0,778	-0,002	0,087
FS	-0,038	0,000	0,003	0,224	-0,002	0,000
LEV	0,005	0,714	0,042	0,009	0,002	0,007
ROA	-0,051	0,079	0,976	0,000	0,224	0,000
MKTB	0,000	0,801	-0,005	0,000	0,000	0,192
Adjusted R-squared		0,424		0,446		0,987
Prob(F-statistic)		0,000		0,000		0,000

Probability values in the results of test f Table 9 against equations 1, 2, and 3 by 0.000; where the value is less than 0.05 which means the variable Independent has a significant effect on the dependent variable simultaneously. Adjusted R-squared value on each measurement of the dependent variable namely ETR, CFETR, and BTD are 42.4%, 44.6, and 98.7%. So, ETR, CFETR, and BTD can be explained by 42.4%, 44.6% and 98.7% respectively by the variables FOWN1 and the remainder by 57.6%, 55.4%, and 1.3% respectively described by other variables. In Table 9, the probability values for the t-test results in equations 1, 2, and 3 it is 0.094; 0,778; and 0.087. All three values It is greater than 0.05 which means family ownership is not significant effect on tax avoidance with ETR measurement, CFETR, as well as BTD. This is because the company with a structure His ownership which is family ownership tends to prefer to make high tax payments instead of having to take risks that will damage the company's good name (Irawati et al., 2020). Test results which was obtained in line with research conducted by Rini & Herliansyah, (2019), Irawati et al., (2020), and Maharani &; Juliarto, (2019). Variable leverage and ROA that positively affect CFETR and BTD. Variable market to book ratio that negatively affects CFETR, as well as variables the size of the company negatively affects BTD.

Table 10. Results of Hypothesis Test in Equations 4, 5, and 6

Variabel	FOWN2					
	ETR		CFETR		BTD	
	Koefisien	Prob.	Koefisien	Prob.	Koefisien	Prob.
C	1,281	0,000	-0,005	0,940	0,048	0,000
FOWN2	0,045	0,002	-0,008	0,253	0,000	0,996
FS	-0,036	0,000	0,002	0,398	-0,002	0,000
LEV	0,007	0,596	0,037	0,018	0,002	0,019
ROA	-0,044	0,113	0,980	0,000	0,223	0,000
MKTB	0,000	0,530	-0,005	0,000	0,000	0,027
Adjusted R-squared		0,475		0,465		0,989
Prob(F-statistic)		0,000		0,000		0,000

Probability values in the results of test f Table 10 against equations 4, 5, and 6 by 0.000; where the value is less than 0.05 which means the variable Independent has a significant effect on the dependent variable simultaneously. Adjusted R-squared value on each measurement of the dependent variable namely ETR, CFETR, and BTD are 47.5 percent, 46.5 percent, and 98.9 percent. So, ETR, CFETR, and BTD can each be explained

by 47.5 percent, 46.5 percent, and 98.9 percent by the FOWN2 variable and the remainder respectively 52.5 percent, 53.5 percent, and 1.1 percent were explained by other variables. Next, using the second measurement of the variable Independently, the t-test results obtained in Table 10 are different. On the feed Table 10, it is known that family ownership has a positive effect on ETR, where the probability value is 0.002. Thus, it can it was concluded that the higher the level of family ownership and the value of ETR In a company, the lower the tax avoidance action that was done. These results are consistent with research by Indirawati & Dwimulyani. (2019), Mafrolla & D'Amico. (2016) and Puji et al. (2019). Instead family ownership has no significant effect on CFETR and BTD, where the probability values are 0.253 and 0.996 respectively. Size the company has a significant negative effect on ETR and BTD. Variable leverage and ROA positively affect CFETR and BTD, as well as MKTB which positively affects BTD, but negatively affects BTD. CFETR.

Table 11. Results of Hypothesis Test in Equations 7, 8, and 9

Variabel	FOWN1XAUDQLY					
	ETR		CFETR		BTD	
	Koefisien	Prob.	Koefisien	Prob.	Koefisien	Prob.
C	1,349	0,000	0,041	0,489	0,049	0,000
FOWN1	0,035	0,129	0,030	0,014	-0,002	0,107
AUDQLY	0,003	0,851	0,067	0,000	0,001	0,135
FOWN1XAUDQLY	0,016	0,562	-0,067	0,000	-0,002	0,260
FS	-0,038	0,000	-0,001	0,624	-0,002	0,000
LEV	0,003	0,812	0,045	0,003	0,002	0,005
ROA	-0,051	0,076	0,947	0,000	0,224	0,000
MKTB	0,000	0,780	-0,005	0,000	0,000	0,185
Adjusted R-squared		0,422		0,500		0,987
Prob(F-statistic)		0,000		0,000		0,000

T-test results in Table 11 with proprietary independent variables The first family of measurements with a moderating effect of audit quality. At As a result, family ownership positively affects CFETR by The probability value is 0.014 and has no effect on the two measurements other tax avoidances with a probability value of 0.129 for ETRs and BTD of 0.107. The moderating effect of audit quality on relationships Family ownership with CFETR has a significantly negative effect on value The probability is 0.000 and the coefficient is -0.067.

Table 12. Results of Hypothesis Test on Equations 10, 11, and 12

Variabel	FOWN2XAUDQLY					
	ETR		CFETR		BTD	
	Koefisien	Prob,	Koefisien	Prob,	Koefisien	Prob,
C	1,268	0,000	0,072	0,203	0,047	0,000
FOWN2	0,044	0,004	0,022	0,012	0,000	0,797
AUDQLY	0,005	0,712	0,079	0,000	0,001	0,079
FOWN2XAUDQLY	0,003	0,874	-0,056	0,000	-0,001	0,398
FS	-0,036	0,000	-0,002	0,236	-0,002	0,000
LEV	0,006	0,621	0,039	0,009	0,002	0,024
ROA	-0,044	0,110	0,946	0,000	0,223	0,000
MKTB	0,000	0,513	-0,005	0,000	0,000	0,024
Adjusted R-squared		0,474		0,536		0,989
Prob(F-statistic)		0,000		0,000		0,000

In Table 12, t-test results with independent variables of measurement second and the moderating effect of audit quality. As in the results that have been presented, family ownership has a significant positive influence on ETR and CFETR with probability values of 0.004 and 0.012, respectively. Effect moderation of quality audits of family ownership relationships with CFETR has a significant negative effect with a probability value of 0.000 and The value of the coefficient is -0.056.

As presented in table 9 of the t test results that the variable Family ownership with the first measurement has no effect on tax avoidance using ETR, CFETR or ETR measurements BTD. Thus, it can be concluded that the first hypothesis on The study was rejected. Thus, a company where family or non-family who is in control of the running of the business does not affect the level of high tax avoidance or not. The final result obtained is the same with results from research by Sujendra et al. (2019), Irawati et al., (2020) and Rakayana et al. (2021), which states tax avoidance measures are not affected by family ownership. While in the presentation of Table 10 test results t states that the family ownership variable with the second measurement significant positive effect on Effective Tax Rate. That is, the company with family ownership tends to have a low percentage in commit tax evasion actions that will result in payment fines for such actions and defamation of companies where Later it will make the company lose. The results of the t-test can be proved the first hypothesis in this study. These results can be supported by research from Chen et al., (2010), Mafrolla & D'Amico, (2016), and Indirawati & Dwimulyani, (2019) who also concluded that ownership Family positively influences tax avoidance. It is also explained in the research of Indirawati &;

Dwimulyani, (2019) which said that conflicts arise that will end up harming all parties who Interested in the event of poor management of a company. Therefore, companies with family ownership structures will avoid such harms and do good things such as no tax avoidance (Indirawati &; Dwimulyani, 2019)

The results of the t-test Table 11 and Table 12, contained the results of the effect of quality moderation Audit of family ownership relationships with first measurement and second and Cash Flow Effective Tax Rate. The results showed that the hypothesis Both studies cannot be proven or accepted. Value The probability of multiplication results in 0.000 and 0.000 respectively with coefficients of -0.067 and -0.056 respectively, where is the direction of the quality effect The audit leads to a negative that contradicts the second hypothesis. Results of This research is in line with research by Gaaya et al (2017) and Wirdaningsih et al. (2016) which states that audit quality weakens relationships family ownership of tax avoidance. Audit quality The weakening of the relationship is due to the implementation of good corporate weak governance in Indonesia (Maharani &; Juliarto, 2019).

4. CONCLUSION

Family-owned companies do not take evasion measures As evidenced by a significantly positive effect on ETRs. Companies with a family ownership structure will avoid things negativity that can damage the good name of the company by complying with regulations which happens rather than having to pay a fine for a bad act Done. Audit quality is not proven to amplify significant influence positive relationship of family ownership and tax avoidance.

There are limitations in the sample of company data that becomes data sample of this study. Many companies that suffered losses were excluded from the sample data which causes the limited remaining sample data to Tested. The company data in question is a company listed on the Exchange Indonesian securities with the period 2017 to 2021. Other limitations is that the tax rate or statutory rate is different from before so it is somewhat It is difficult to determine the limit. Future research may add some independent variables such as Foreign Ownership variables are present in the research of Rakayana et al (2021) and Corporate Social Responsibility on research Sujendra et al. (2019). Foreign Ownership to see if Foreign companies engage in high tax avoidance or

not, as well as to find out if CSR is helpful in economic development Companies by acting ethically can influence tax avoidance.

Measuring tax avoidance using ETR will reduce A lot of the sample data is because it has to eliminate company data that suffered a loss. For subsequent research, it is recommended to use tax avoidance proxies such as the Temporary book tax difference (Temp BTD) that explained in the research of Wirdaningsih et al. (2018).

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